evaluating the legal, administrative, regulatory and institutional impediments for foreign direct investment (FDI). 7 The IAB indicators were developed contemporaneously with an increase in cross-border land investments deals in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Whilst on first apprehension, such investments may appear innocuous and even beneficial, aimed at increasing FDI and opportunities for development, there is a growing consensus that these deals, as currently 
Introduction
The Global Food and Financial crisis of 2008 necessitated new investments in agriculture for food consumption as well as for biofuel requirements. These new investments took the character of large scale foreign investments on vast tracts of land in developing countries. As international trade and investments registered significant improvements in the first half of 2010, the IAB indicators were developed to assess the regulation of foreign owned companies and the impediments to FDI. 8 There can be little doubt that the land investment deals have the potential to unlock the wealth that resides in agricultural land. There also exist potential dangers to local communities, women and other vulnerable groups, and to the environment. 9 Thus, in one sense, these land investment deals are mutually beneficial and can be viewed as development finance. On the other hand, they can be harmful to the environment and to the life and livelihoods of local communities, in which case they would constitute 'land grabs. ' The question that arises is whether and how the IAB indicators can enhance the potential for sustainable growth and development or, conversely, encourage the establishment of economic and legal frameworks that result in inequitable land investment deals.
The growing influence of indicators in the area of global governance and policy formulation makes such an enquiry even more pertinent. 10 Governments and various other actors in the IDA are using indicators as a guide for legislative reform, strategic allocation of resources, and general having to necessarily improve performance in that particular area.
11
Indeed, the promotion of FDI does not necessarily have to be at odds with the promotion of sustainable development for the host countries. If, however, indicators are formulated in such a way that it is the investor that disproportionally stands to benefit from investment deals to the detriment of host-country citizens, and that goes against existing social and environmental norms, then these tools can effectively contribute to the promotion of unsavory practices commonly referred to as 'land grabbing.' Such a tension within the IDA, between the policy prescriptions produced through indicators and those produced through compliance with existing (and evolving) social and environmental norms needs to be addressed. The purpose of this exploration is to identify means for securing respect for the entitlements of rural populations that are affected by land investment deals so as to secure the benefits of these deals for local citizens and also maintain the integrity and internal consistency of the IDA. In other words, our aim is to consider mechanisms for ensuring that investments in land, which can have positive developmental effects, are prevented from turning into grabbing of land.
Finally, we argue for the need to conduct critical reviews of indicators on an ongoing basis. This continuous review process will enable indicators to continue to serve stakeholders while responding to the dynamism and ever-evolving nature of the IDA. 
What is Land Grabbing?
Land grabbing generally refers to the acquisitions of vast tracts of land by more wealthy countries and private investors which result in harmful effects for local communities and/or the environment. 12 Typically, land grabbing takes the form of the acquisition of controlling stakes in tracts of land far much bigger than that used in average land holdings in a country. 13 More substantial benefits may lie in the area of infrastructural development, modernization of rural areas and employment creation. 17 In Kenya for instance, the Government of Qatar undertook to build US$ 3.4 billion sea port in return for a lease of 40,000 hectares of land. 18 Combined with increased investment in agriculture, this investment could boost the export volumes from developing countries whilst simultaneously improving the quality of agricultural produce. 19 Related technology transfers would also lead to a transfer of expertise to the local population resulting in capacity building. Therefore, with appropriate deals concluded in the context of enabling frameworks, land investments could be mutually beneficial, and it could be argued that they supply a welcome stream of development finance.
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The investing countries certainly benefit from the output of the investments. In this way, the food insecurity and demand for biofuel are addressed. Conversely, the local farmers will learn and benefit from the transfer of knowledge and skills. These synergies with local communities could also lead to more environmentally sustainable methods of farming. 
Potential threats
Land grabbing accelerates the trends of de-peasantization, large-scale commercial farming and tenure re-arrangements favoring international agribusiness. 22 It can lead to loss of livelihoods 23 and displacement of various populations. It is commented that land grabbing has more impact on the world's poor than climate change. 24 In an interview, Fred Pearce notes that poor people were being moved off the land with little regard for their historical and cultural rights, with centuries of history being destroyed. African countries are unable to produce sufficient food for their populations. 29 The dependency of these countries on imports and hand-outs through foreign aid is therefore being perpetuated by these investments. As rightly noted 'there is a dangerous disconnect between increasing investment in agriculture through rich countries taking over land in poor countries and the goal of securing food supplies for poor and vulnerable populations.' 30 These commercial transactions must also be viewed from the grand scheme of opening up farmlands to the global financial markets. Once these deals come into effect, the farmlands become subject to the vicissitudes of far-off markets whose slight flinching may affect local workers in very real ways, including their wages. In such a scenario, the prospects for social unrest from growing inequality increase exponentially. 31 Another concern that has been raised is the danger of African states evolving into Agro-fuel republics, giving into the influence of (and desire to attract) the foreign private sector, rather than to their own citizenry.
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There is also the matter of land reform that remains an urgent necessity in most developing countries. 33 The increased demand for land through land grabbing has further increased the tension on the farmlands with the interests of small-scale farmers and those of private sector investors clashing.
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The overwhelming inclination by governments in developing countries to offer contracts on concessionary terms, and to proverbially "race to the bottom," has the ultimate effect of titling these agreements in favor of investors. 35 .
It is for these reasons that the World Bank, in a report published in 2011, acknowledged that there exist "real dangers" of "uncompensated land loss by existing land users and land being 31 In the case of Central American countries, the term 'banana republic' came to symbolize politically unstable countries reliant on one raw material for export ruled by self-elected elite that is influenced by big trans-national corporations. This was caused by the political influence required for US companies such as United Fruit, Standard Fruit, and Cuyamel Fruit to maintain their dominance over through rights in land. 35 In Ethiopia for instance, the government has no minimum capital required to start of such an investment and has exempted foreign agricultural activities from paying customs duties and taxes on imports of goods. See, Fouad and Charles, n. 22, p. 8, Ibid. In Pakistan, investors retain 100 percent proprietary rights and enjoy a tax holiday for 10 years, without which they would need to pay taxes and duty on their imports and keep a percentage of their produce in the Pakistani market. They are however permitted to retain 100 percent of their profits and dividends as well as 100 % repatriation of produce to their home countries. business and addresses the experience of business, and measures the quality of business laws and related institutions across many countries. 40 Its ideology is reflected in its policies. The indicators are in turn intended to reflect more or less the same policy ideas.
The IAB indicators measure regulation of foreign direct investment in 87 of the world's economies. 41 The project is intended to identify good practices, stimulate reform, and provide a platform for shared learning from a large and diffuse set of experiences. 42 The data is collected and presented in four categories; the relevant categories for our purposes include "Investing Across Sectors," and "Accessing Industrial Land." 43 By ranking countries under the four categories, the indicators seek to promote those regulatory frameworks that "…both do not overburden investors and provide sufficient protections for environments and citizens." 44 The IAB has 23 indicators across the four categories. Countries are not ranked against each other in an ordinal way. Rather, the data is presented as a comparative figure of the regional and global average of that particular sector. 45 Instead of a list, a country' performance is exhibited through a figure which is relative to the performance of other countries in its region and around the world. institutional frameworks that apply to the former apply to the latter and as such, the indicators still serve as a point of reference and guidance to both groups of investors in spite of the assumption that the indicators only relate to private multinational companies.
The Accessing Industrial Land indicators evaluate domestic regulatory frameworks to assess how easy / complicated it is for a foreign investor to lease or own land, as well as availability of information about the land. 56 Measurement is done for the following categories:
• Strength of lease rights index (0-100)
• Strength of ownership rights index (0-100)
• Access to land information index (0-100)
• Availability of land information index (0-100)
• Time to lease private land (days)
• Some of the survey questions do not necessarily affect land investment deals and land grabbing, which is the case of the points awarded to countries that allow foreign companies to renew their leases. Other questions are far more directly related to land grabbing. For instance, countries are awarded points for allowing foreign firms to lease land; there are even more points for those countries that allow the transfer of the leases; and when it is possible to effect such a transfer to another foreign company, then the country is awarded even more points. Further, under the bonus questions, countries that allow foreign firms to fast track their applications for leases can earn additional points. This is noteworthy given that the survey questions award points for equal treatment of foreign and domestic companies. Further, countries in which there is no higher transaction cost for foreign companies score even higher. Foreign companies are therefore to be treated the same way and charged at the same rate as domestic companies. On the other hand, transfer of leases between foreign companies is awarded extra points, as is the option of speeding up transactions by foreign companies. The contradiction is clear; whilst the indicators call for non-discrimination of foreign companies, they openly incentivize countries to give preferential treatment to and for transactions between foreign companies.
The Statutory Limit for Leases Index assesses the maximum period for which a lease can be granted. The maximum number of years permitted for a lease is divided by the figure 100 to produce the points to be awarded. A country that allows foreign investors to lease for 100 years or more, or with unlimited lease periods, is awarded the highest point of 1. 61 Further, countries are awarded points for permitting foreign countries to lease an unlimited amount of land. The message is clear: in order to receive a high score under the IAB, and to boost its prospects for attracting FDI, foreign companies must have access to unlimited lease periods for unlimited amounts of land.
Here, the bonus questions evaluate whether a country allows foreign companies to have their applications for leases fast tracked for a fee. They also examine whether a particular country requires environmental and social impact assessments and community consultations during the lease period. 62 The bonus questions reward countries that have such requirements in place, but there is no penalty for those that do not. Some argue that tracking the environmental and social impact of investments is an integral part of doing business successfully in developing countries, and that notions of corporate social responsibility are informed and (re)defined by developing countries' experiences of engaging with foreign investors. 63 Yet the IAB indicators treat this impact-assessing and tracking dimension as optional, rather than as essential for achieving optimal economic performance. This is at odds with the stated intent of the IFC policies to protect citizens and the environment; this disconnect is aggravated by the increasing relevance and popularity of "triple bottom line" investing, where social and environmental returns are measured and pursued, alongside financial returns.
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The strength of Ownership Rights Index is measured over eight survey questions and a bonus question. In this category, a legal framework which allows foreign ownership of land will only score highly if it allows such purchase without the need for local partnership. 65 It is insufficient to allow foreign ownership of land, but rather this ownership must be exclusively in the hands of the foreign company without any need to be in partnership with a domestic investor. Further, countries are awarded points for permitting a foreign company to sell land without seeking permission. Further points are awarded where such sell can be made to another foreign firm.
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This standard is similar to the one which awards points for permitting foreign companies to transfer leases to other foreign companies. In a nutshell, the IAB indicators encourage the establishment of legal frameworks that enable foreign owned companies to buy or lease unlimited amounts of land for unlimited periods whilst being treated the same as the domestic firms, and that provide the option to fast-track transactions upon payment of a fee. The fewer the regulations, the fewer the requirements for government approvals, and the more room there is for transactions to take place between foreign owned companies, the more countries are likely to be viewed as attractive for FDI purposes. The IAB indicators make the concession that they do not dwell on legal social and environmental encourages countries to adopt 'rank-seeking' behavior rather than improve social and environmental protections which have little to no effect on the points awarded. Evictions are to be avoided, and, where unavoidable, the detrimental effects of such evictions are to be mitigated through provision of compensation for loss of assets and "…ensuring that resettlement activities are implemented with appropriate disclosure of information, consultation, and the informed participation of those affected." 89 The investor is also required to provide the displaced persons with security of tenure at the resettlement sites. Environmental and social protections are treated as an integral part of the investment which must be accounted for and reported on "…as a way of doing business in a sustainable way." 90 They are not an optional part of doing business unlike in the IAB indicators. The IFC has an Environmental and Social Review
Procedure through which it assesses the social and environmental risks which its clients are exposed to and the capacity that each client has to deal with the risks. 91 The outcome of this review process is "…an important factor in IFC's decision to finance a client or not." 101 Rather, we turn to Standards because they are widely accepted and used, and because they help to demonstrate that there are some troublingly contradictory practices currently taking shape within the IDA. As explained above, the assessment of domestic frameworks conducive to attracting FDI barely refers to environmental and social protections and community protections. Such protections appear mainly in the context of bonus points, and countries that do not require social or environmental impact assessment or consultations are not penalized. In general, countries score well if they do not have laws on their books that require partnership with local firms, and if they provide unlimited lease periods for unlimited amounts of land, without governmental approval. In contrast, the IFC acknowledges the need for investors to be sensitive to the views and needs of local peoples and their cultural heritage in its Standards. Rather than relegating the social and environmental dimensions of foreign investment to the bonus point category, which effectively renders related measures optional, the IFC Standards mandate that solicitation of input from affected populations, consultations, and mitigation measures need be undertaken.
Whilst on the one hand the IAB indicators push policy makers to treat foreign firms in the same way as local firms and avoid creating obligations for foreign firms to partner with local entities, the IFC Standards require firms to be sensitive to the plight of local peoples and to partner with them whenever possible. Consequently, rather than being mutually reinforcing, efforts to promote 101 See, Catching up to the past five years: Recommendations for the IFC's environmental and social sustainability framework "An ongoing criticism of the IFC Performance Standards is that many clients reduce them to a checklist of the minimal activities necessary to receive financing. IFC, in turn, lacks effective ways to ensure that these activities lead to actual, improved environmental and social performance on the ground. For example, consultations with local communities often become "information sharing" sessions rather than an opportunity for affected people to participate meaningfully in project decision-making. 
2010.
114 The Principles are intended to provide a framework for national regulations, international investment agreements, global corporate social responsibility initiatives and individual investor contracts. They reinforce the need for public participation and consultation, respect for land tenure rights and the primacy of food security concerns. They also emphasize the need for social sustainability through transfer of technology. 115 Again, the fact that the IAB indicators award higher scores to countries that do not impose a local partnerships requirement hampers efforts to ensure social sustainability.
Every business venture has the potential to have positive and negative impacts on people and human rights -those rights and freedoms that the international community has agreed that people need in order to live with dignity. In some cases, where the potential positive and negative human rights impacts of a venture are direct and significant, managing human rights risks will be an essential consideration to be included at the earliest stages of the life cycle of the venture. This is 114 The Principles, <http://archive.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=6123&lang=1>, (Accessed on April 23, 2012). The principles are: Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are recognized and respected. Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it. Principle 3: Processes relating to investment in agriculture are transparent, monitored, and ensure accountability by all stakeholders, within a proper business, legal, and regulatory environment. Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements from consultations are recorded and enforced. Long-term stability comes when all interests benefit from an agreement, and when the agreement contributes to both business success and the sustainable development of the societies in which mines operate. 121 This document serves as a model for a country to produce a binding investment contract code that gives space specific contracts to be agreed between parties taking into consideration the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the particular transaction and the special relationship of the parties. Agreements need to bear in mind, amongst other things, the desires of local communities, social aspects of closure, and dispute settlement mechanisms.
However, it is important that the code incorporates some controlling principles regarding the fairness, balance and legality of the agreements to be concluded. 137 See IAB methodology, n. 42, ibid: As noted, the indicators do not highlight issues related to environmental and social protections for host countries, though the IAB survey did examine these in the context of leasing land 138 See IAB methodology, n. 42, ibid: The indicators (like many other data sets) should not be considered in isolation, but in conjunction with other indicators and reports --such as the Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) ii--that reflect a country's other needs, circumstances, and socioeconomic development. 
